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Abstract
This thesis provides a way for users to easily add and remove devices to secure groups,
allowing for a more intuitive way of making connections between devices. These
groups allow users to seamlessly make connections between their devices once devices
are added to a group. Current models for sending data from device to device either
involve proprietary cables and manufacturer-specific connectors or complex systems
of PINs and passwords to authorize a user/device. In an environment where a user
expects to be able to quickly send data between his mobile devices, the time it takes
to initialize a connection should not be longer than the time it takes to send the
data. The solution proposed in this thesis establishes a model using groups, with
group owners and group members. Groups are identified using shared public and
private key pairs. The group model establishes implicit trusted relationships between
members of a group without having to explicitly authorize a member, simplifying and
reducing the number of authenticated links a user must create between his devices.
Thesis Supervisor: Larry Rudolph
Title: Principal Research Scientist
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Chapter 1
Introduction
As the number of mobile devices increases, so does the need of having a natural
way for an owner to authorize connections between them. One natural way is to
create groups of devices that mimic the hierarchy of trust between family, friends,
and strangers. Current mobile devices are non-intuitive and not simple to connect:
they require the user to type in passwords, find cables to connect, or follow arcane
instructions to set up secure wireless connections. This thesis creates a way to set
up and maintain scalable, secure, groups of mobile devices that require minimal user
interaction.
A user should be able to use his mobile device without worrying about how he will
get information from one device to another. Interaction should be intuitive, meaning
conceptually simple and taking little effort to understand; and easy, meaning the
device takes minimal learning to use and operate. If a user wants to send a file
from a laptop to a PDA, he should be able to do that without trying to find cables,
connect to a network, or find the right application. A user should be able to send
a picture from his phone to his PDA without typing in a password. As the number
of mobile devices that a user owns increases, he expects to be able to have all of
them communicate with each other without trying to find the right cable, the right
connector, the network to use, the right application to use. The different types of
connectors or cables vary from device to device and manufacturer to manufacturer
[4].
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Mobile devices, because of an effort to make them secure, require users to jump
through many hoops before a connection can be made. No good method exists for
a user to easily manage his devices. Passwords and PINs become a hassle as users
have more and more devices to keep track of. Elaborate user schemes are created to
maximize security for mobile devices. Efforts for wireless communications between
mobile devices include the use of 802.11, Bluetooth, or IR. Because of power concerns,
security issues, or bandwidth requirements, each of these technologies has their pros
and cons [7].
The solution to this problem is to create groups of devices that have both implicit
and explicit trust relationships. Creation of the groups require minimal user interface
and remain secure through the use of public and private key encryption. This thesis
uses Bluetooth as a specific example of how these groups can be applied to a real
implementation. The requirements for the solution are:
* the system must be secure from eavesdropping and replay attacks
* the system must have an intuitive user interface
* the system must be easy/simple to use
* the system must be low power
* the system must be scalable to a large number of devices
* the system must be easily implementable
* the system must allow for adding and removing of users dynamically
* the system must not require substantial computational power or large amounts
of memory
14
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Chapter 2
Background
A user's world of computational devices and communications devices has rapidly
changed from a world of static, wired devices, to a world of mobile, wireless devices.
As the number of mobile devices in an environment increases, new infrastructures
must be designed to support the changes. The same principles and ideas behind wired,
static networks still exist in the wireless world, but the requirements are different.
The way in which devices are networked is dependent upon the number of devices,
the type of applications the network is used for, and the capabilities of the devices
themselves. To help understand the similarities and differences between wired and
wireless networks, this chapter describes the different types of networks and some
generalizations that can be made about them.
2.1 Types of networks
Wired and wireless networks are significantly different in the way they are intended
to be used. Wired networks have a core infrastructure that connects the devices
on the network to each other via set switch boxes or routers. Wired networks are
used for backbone structures where nodes remain fixed in one location. Wireless
networks can be either infrastructure, or ad-hoc, where there is no fixed method for
connections or a persistent network. The connections are created dynamically when
needed. Wireless networks are intended for applications where the nodes dynamically
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move around within a network and also in and out of the network. Within each type
of network, there are point to point connections, bus-based connections or piconets,
and large distributed networks.
Wired networks support large numbers of devices, can transmit high bandwidth
information, and are applicable for any number of uses. The devices on a wired net-
work can range anywhere from a mouse or a keyboard to a server on the backbone of
the Internet. Devices on a wired network have a small range of physical movement,
their wires usually limit where they can be located. However, the wires and sedentary
nature also allow wired devices to have unlimited power supplies and virtually unlim-
ited storage capacity. Wired networks can be point to point connections, such as the
connections between keyboard and PC. Wired networks can also be bus-based, like a
network of USB devices; or large distributed systems, like the Internet or telephone
system.
Wired networks can cover large areas or small areas. For example, the backbone
of the Internet runs on thousands of miles of fiber connecting the entire world, while
the connections between a PC and its peripheral devices is no more than a few feet.
There is also a set structure for how the network is connected and how each device
becomes a part of the network. Adding new devices to the network is a well defined
procedure, whether it be paying an Internet Service Provider (ISP) for an account or
talking to a system administrator to set up a new machine, it involves some sort of
central system that maintains the network.
Security for wired networks generally uses a model requiring a centralized, trusted
unit, as in a trusted third party system or a certificate authority [20]. Attackers can
come from anywhere, whether it be from an authorized user of the network or an
outsider breaking in to the network. The attacks can range from physical destruction
of the connections or devices on the network, to denial of service attacks preventing
any sort of communications. Security goals for networks include authorization, to
ensure only the appropriate users can access the network; authentication, to make
sure the users are who they claim they are, and confidentiality, to make sure only the
appropriate users see sensitive data [16]. There are many types of security systems
16
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to solve those problems.
Wireless networks, on the other hand, support functionality for mobile devices.
The networks can be very application specific, as with sensor networks, or they can be
very broad, as with wireless LANs. Because mobile devices are intended to be carried
around or easily moved from place to place, mobile devices are limited by their power
supply and physical size. Wireless networks, like their wired counterparts, can also
be divided into categories of point to point, bus-based or piconet, and distributed
networks. Point to point wireless networks are like cable replacement technologies
for wireless mice or keyboards, or even the Bluetooth connection for sending pictures
between two cell phones. Bus-based networks are like a piconet of Bluetooth devices,
where a master is communicating on the same channel as all of the slaves [12]. Dis-
tributed wireless networks are like 802.11 technology, which is the wireless version of
Ethernet.
Wireless networks can be ad-hoc or infrastructure networks. Ad-hoc networks are
created on-the-fly, with no routing table for communications between devices. Ad-
hoc networks are created when a series of devices create peer-to-peer connections and
use the connections between nodes to pass information from one device to the next.
Infrastructure networks have a set of access points that provide a persistent network.
The network is not dependent upon the devices that are present, it always exists.
The devices on an ad-hoc network can physically come and go. On the other hand,
ad-hoc networks can fall apart if too many of the key hosts leave.
Wireless networks are susceptible to the same attacks as wired networks, but in
addition, wireless networks can fall prey to eavesdropping and interference attacks.
Wireless networks are much harder to limit access to because of their dynamic nature.
Users on the network leave and return, impersonation attacks are a popular way to
gain entry into wireless networks [21]. Especially for ad-hoc wireless networks, each
node must be able to secure itself from attackers without protection from a system-
wide, central security network [11].
The centralized security models do not work well for wireless networks because
the devices are mobile. The central trusted party must be available no matter where
17
Table 2.1: Table showing the categories of wired and wireless networks.
Wired Networks Wireless Networks
point-to-point connections serial cables, keyboards, mice IR, RF
bus-based connections USB Bluetooth piconets
distributed networks Ethernet 802.11 technology
the mobile device is. There are times when a mobile device might not be in contact
range of the trusted entity. In addition, central authorities could be a single point of
attack for a security breach into the network if there is no distributed system.
A summary of the different types of wired and wireless devices is given in Table
2.1.
2.2 Security Systems
2.2.1 Access Control Lists
Access control lists (ACLs) are one method for determining which users are authorized
to use the network. The network administrator, or even each individual device,
maintains a list of users allowed on the network (or allowed to access the device).
Users must prove who they are by presenting some sort of ID and a password that
corresponds to that ID. If the ID matches an entry on the ACL, the user is allowed
privileges to the network. The IDs can be usernames, IP addresses, hardware device
addresses or some other form of identifying token. Access control lists allow for
easy maintenance since revocation of a user's access privileges are done by simply
removing the user's ID from the access list. Access control lists work well if the lists
being maintained are guaranteed to be secure and the administrator of the lists is a
trusted entity.
Using access control lists also requires enough storage space to maintain a list
of users and corresponding passwords. Access control lists can also be extended to
groups for situations where individual entries become unmanageable. Individuals
18
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belong to a group access list, and one identifying name is chosen for the entire group,
which can be used for access.
2.2.2 Certificate Authority
A model for authentication of a user is the use of certificates and certificate author-
ities. Certificate systems require a central trusted server that acts as the certificate
authority. This certificate authority decides which users to trust. Trusted users are
issued a certificate by the authority. The certificate acts as a token saying to other
devices "if you trust this certificate authority, then you can trust me as well." This
system works well if devices do not want to maintain their own access lists. Anyone
with a valid certificate will be trusted and it is up to the certificate authority to de-
termine who is trusted. However, this system depends on a central server that must
be secure. If the certificate authority is compromised, then all certificates become
void and new certificates must be issued. Revocation of a certificate is hard because
the user holds on to the token, so there is no way for anyone, even the certificate
authority, to take away that certificate. Certificates usually have expiration dates
after which the owner of the certificate must return to a certificate authority and
renew the certificate or get a new one.
2.2.3 Key Encryption systems
Various types of key exchange systems are also used for network security. Key systems
allow devices both to encrypt a message and authenticate a user. Shared secret keys
use one key that is shared between various devices that need to authenticate each
other. The key can also be used to encrypt a message designated only for those
individuals with the shared key. Shared keys are simple to keep track of since there
is only one key, and computationally inexpensive, but the disadvantage is that once
the more devices that know the shared secret, the more insecure it becomes. Thus
shared secret keys are not readily scalable.
Public/Private key pairs are more complex because of the two keys that must
19
Bob Alice
Bobpublic_key
[message] ._,
message]Bobprivate_key
Figure 2-1: Bob sends Alice a message that has been signed with Bob's private key.
Alice has a copy of Bob's public key and can verify that the message was from Bob
by using the public key.
be maintained, and the associated computational complexity of the two keys, but
have the advantage that a key can be used either for encryption of a message, or for
authentication of a message. A user's private key can be used to sign a message. The
receiver of that message can verify who sent it by using a corresponding public key
to verify the message, as shown in Figure 2-1.
Conversely, a user can encrypt a message with a receiving device's public key, and
the receiving device can decrypt that message with the private key. The convenience
with public keys is that the system is secure no matter who gets a hold of a public
key. There are also public key systems that employ the use of group keys [3, 6, 14].
This combines the idea of group access control lists with keys such that a group can
have a shared public key to identify members of the group. The owner of the group
issues some sort of token to each member of the group, much like a certificate, so that
group members can prove their affiliation.
2.3 Wireless technology
There are many different wireless technologies, each designed to fill a certain need
in a certain area. Depending on the size of the network and the distance of the
communications, and also the amount and type of information passed on the network,
the design will vary.
802.11 networks are a wireless version of Ethernet. Mobile devices connect to
the rest of the network via access points. The access points contain the radios that
send network data across the air. 802.11 networks operate in the unlicensed 2.4 GHz
20
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spectrum, which is the same as microwaves and many cordless phones. 802.11 is fairly
power hungry, especially for use in mobile devices that are often battery powered [7].
802.11 chip size is also fairly large, so it's difficult to use in small devices that are
limited in space. However, 802.11 is good for longer distance communications and for
high bandwidth applications.
Bluetooth is designed for short range, wideband communications [15]. It is best
used for peer to peer communications and exchanges of short messages or single files.
Bluetooth is low power and small chip size. Bluetooth also operates in the 2.4 GHz
spectrum. While the 2.4 GHz band has a fair amount of traffic, Bluetooth avoids
interference problems by using a frequency hopping spread spectrum scheme so that
packets are sent on different frequencies determined by a pseudo-random function
[12]. Bluetooth has a variety of security models and encryption methods that make
it complex to implement.
IR (infrared) is another wireless protocol that is useful for inexpensive, short
range, low bandwidth communications [19]. Easily utilized in a system because no
government licenses are required to operate in the IR range, IR is also limited because
it requires direct line of sight communications. However, the line of sight limitations
also make IR a simpler communications method to keep secure.
21
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Chapter 3
Problem
The challenge is that a mobile user connects to many devices on a regular basis, and
needs to be able to set up a trusted network with those devices, as shown in Figure 3-
1. The security checks and authentication/authorization procedures needed to make
a connection should be necessary only initially, and should happen automatically
thereafter. Solutions to this problem should generalize to devices that are limited in
user interface and computational capability. A user should not have to authenticate
himself and enter a password each time. When a new device is introduced to the
existing network, the user should be able to intuitively add the device as a trusted
entity to the network with minimal interaction. The user should not have to count
on a central authority being available to add the new device to the network.
mobile device
. - user
| home [ | office 7
| network I network
Figure 3-1: A mobile user and his networks of devices.
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Current network models are not designed for ad-hoc networks. This chapter dis-
cusses the current problem and the challenges that need to be overcome and the
requirements necessary to create a network of trusted mobile devices.
3.1 Too many mobile devices
Lots of mobile devices need to belong in a trusted network. A user should not have
to explicitly make a connection between each of his devices every time he wants to
use them. For example, Bob has a PDA that contains his calendar, his address book,
and some documents he wants to read. To print wirelessly to his printer, Bob has to
make a connection and enter his password to verify that he can use the printer. If
Bob wants to update the calendar on his laptop, he has to enter his password to make
a secure connection to his laptop. If Bob wants to synchronize the address book to
his cell phone, he needs to create a connection and enter a password to authenticate
himself to the cell phone. Bob should expect to just be able to use these devices when
he needs to, not have to prove he is a valid user each time. There should be a way
for the devices to remember that information.
Network connectivity with mobile devices is a difficult problem because of security,
reliability, naming, and power consumption. Wireless networks are often insecure
because of the tradeoffs between a fully secured network and ease with which a user
can connect to it. With mobile devices that cannot remain on indefinitely, networks
cannot count on having all devices present at all times to correctly route data from
one node to the next. Each node must have all the information necessary to do what
it needs to do.
Additionally, current network models are not human centric and do not provide
for an intuitive way to connect devices securely. Entering passwords takes too much
user effort, and maintaining access lists are infeasible on devices with limited memory.
Also, many devices that would lend itself well to wireless technologies are not wireless
because of the challenges associated with accessing networks securely using a device
with minimal user interface.
24
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3.2 Current network models
Different types of networks have different needs. A personal area network in someone's
home does not have to worry about security as much as a large local area network at a
company [15]. A large local area network at a company does not have the scalability
problems with naming that a wide area network might have. The size of the networks
and the density of the devices in a network plays a huge role in determining trade
offs in a design.
The following section presents a few different network models grouped by the
type and number of devices in the network. A discussion on the roles of naming and
authentication in a networks is included. Networks can range from having no fixed
naming scheme to a set address for each device. Authentication can range also range
from authenticating each and every user or to no authentication at all. Comparisons
are made between networks of static devices and mobile devices. Static devices are
devices that have an unlimited power supply, persistent network connection, unlimited
storage capacity, and high computation power. Mobile devices have limited power
supplies, are not always connected to a network, have limited storage capacity, and
limited computation power.
3.2.1 Network with static devices only
These devices are always connected to some sort of network via a wired connection
or a wireless connection. The physical location of these devices does not change, and
these devices are always on, as shown in Figure 3-2. If one machine is turned off,
the other machines are still able to remain connected via some sort of centralized
system. A system administrator individually adds every device or user (depending
on the system) to the network using some IP address and maintains a secure network.
Ethernet is an example of a network with static only devices.
Naming for a static system is simple since the devices do not move around from
network to network. A fixed name or address for each device will always be sufficient
to find the device. Authorization for a static system is also simple. Not only is there
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the option to have a system administrator add and remove users from the network,
but there are physical wires connecting the devices. Adding or removing users can
be as simple as physically plugging in or unplugging the device.
Figure 3-2: A network of static devices.
3.2.2 Network with some static devices and some mobile de-
vices
This type of network has static devices that are connected to a fixed network, as
described in the previous model, but in addition, has mobile devices that move in
and out of the network. Mobile devices connect via a static device, using it as an
access point, as shown in Figure 3-3. The entire network, like the previous model,
is monitored by a system administrator that controls access to the network. These
static devices can be PCs or access points that provide network connectivity.
The above model applies to almost all wireless networks currently in use, like
802.11 or cellular networks. Static access points administered by a central system
allow mobile devices to connect whenever they are near an access point. Mobile
devices can come and go as they please, knowing that there is always some sort of
network present that they can connect to.
Authorization for wireless LANs have been implemented in two ways. One method
is to check for authorization during the connection process to the system. This
method places the burden on the access points and forces the user to present a secure
26
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key or password to connect to the access point. The other method is to check for
authorization after a user has been connected to the network but before the user is
allowed to do anything on the network, i.e. send mail, open web browser, etc. Thus,
the access points allow anyone to connect, but once connected, the system will check
for authorization using passwords or some sort of pre-registration process.
Naming for a system with some static and some mobile devices can be done in a
way that the mobile devices use the naming scheme of whatever static network they
connect to. Thus, if a PDA is connecting to a PC, the PDA can follow the naming
scheme of the PC's network. Because the mobile devices use the fixed network to
communicate with other mobile devices, the fixed naming scheme allows them to
locate each other.
r
.o
Figure 3-3: An environment with a mixed number of static and mobile devices.
3.2.3 Network with one static device and many mobile de-
vices
This network is a subset of the previous network. Naming and authentication can be
done as withl the previous network. With the limit of only one static device, there is
now a concern that the one static device may not be able to support all the wireless
devices that need to connect to it. This model works for small networks like home
wireless networks or cell towers in isolated areas. This model also works for wire or
cable replacement systems. For example, everything in a home network is connected
27
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to the PC-the printer, scanner, PDA, keyboard, mouse, etc. All the wires for those
connections can be replaced by a wireless technology.
r~
0
I a ,0 00, 0DO
Figure 3-4: A network with one static device and multiple mobile devices.
3.2.4 Network with many mobile devices
In a network with many mobile devices, there is no longer the always on, persistent
network that exists with the previous several examples. Just because one mobile
device connects with another does not mean that they are suddenly part of a larger
network. These two devices are isolated and can only communicate with each other.
There is no central system or central static device that can help determine how to
route packets from one device to another. Two mobile devices could be in the same
room and have no idea about each other.
Picking a standardized naming solution for a network of completely mobile devices
is challenging because there is no central node to determine the naming system for
the entire network. The naming system could be established by the first two devices
making a connection, but it might not work well for any subsequent devices. Most
mobile networks have no set naming scheme. Devices are often renamed when they
join a new network. In addition, prior to connecting, there is no way for a device to
know the name of another. It cannot go through some router or switch box to ask for
a connection to a certain device. Additionally, authorization also becomes difficult
for completely mobile networks. The problems shown in Chapter 2 regarding securityf r c letel  ile et r s. e r le s s  i  t r  re ar i  sec rit
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for wireless networks is seen in this situation.
This is a situation where there is no good solution yet. There are many ideas
for ad-hoc networks [18, 2], yet few have been deployed for actual use. Despite
the fact that 802.11 networks can be implemented as ad-hoc networks, all working
implementations have at least one static access point somewhere to act as a gateway
to the rest of the network. If a group of laptops connected to each other with 802.11,
it would purely be a LAN, with no connection to the rest of the Internet. If a new
device comes along and managed to connect to one device, it has no way of knowing
how to connect to the other devices. There is no common naming scheme such that
a device can just say "find me Bob," or "send this packet to this IP address." Even
if two cell phones are connected, there is no way for one of those cell phones to act
as a gateway to other cell phones.
...................
o..";
Figure 3-5: An environment with only mobile devices.
Access lists and certificates can be used on static devices and mobile and static
networks for security. Mobile only networks require some sort of decentralized se-
curity system that does not depend on the presence of a specific node. Mobile to
mobile connection is a hard problem because of the requirements necessary to build
a functional secure system.
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3.3 Current models
Many research projects have looked at ways to create secure ad-hoc networks for
mobile-only systems. These systems include secure public wireless access for 802.11,
cryptographic protocols at various different levels of the network layers, and group
validation systems.
However, most projects look at the problem of securely routing ad-hoc wireless
networks [18, 13] or depending on a minimum number of entities to create the base
for a secure ad-hoc network [20]. While all of these solutions scale well for a large
number of mobile devices, they do not scale down well for a small number of devices.
One proposal for providing security to mobile ad-hoc networks is the use of thresh-
old secret sharing, as described in [10, 9]. This model proposes distribution of certifi-
cate authority responsibility to members of a network. Any K members can collec-
tively perform the role of a certificate authority once K is greater than a predetermined
threshold. An entity requesting to join the network can do so by collecting K partial
secrets from the members of a network and creating a complete secret. While this
model scales well for large networks and does not require the use of a central authority
during operation, it assumes the presence of a central authority to create the secret
in the first place. It also assumes that a critical number of secret holders will be
present in a network. The goal in this system, and with using threshold schemes for
managing cryptographic keys in general, is to find a balance between the number of
secret holders it takes to make the system secure, without making that number so
high such that it becomes inconvenient to access all the secret holders [17].
Another proposal is based on the PGP "web of trust" model [1, 8] where a user
becomes trusted if a current member of the network vouches for that user or certifies
his trustworthiness. Each new member of a network must be introduced into the
network by a current member. The web of trust model is extended to ad-hoc networks
in [11]. This is a localized trust model where a new entity requesting access to a
network becomes trusted if some k number of trusted entities in the network agree
within a certain set time period to trust the new entity. If there are not enough
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trusted entities within range of the new entity, it must wait for more entities to come
within range or move to a location with more devices. This model does not have
the problem of requiring a certificate authority to start the chain of trust, but still
depends on a device-rich environment.
3.4 Requirements for a new system
While the above ideas create ways to establish networks of secure devices, they also
depend on a critical number of devices to be present. The solution needs to be able
to support a large number of devices, but also be able to scale down well for two- or
three-device networks. The goal is to create a system where authentication of users
and authorization of privileges need only be done once to add a member to a network
and complexity of the device does not play a role in the type of system implemented.
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Chapter 4
Solution
The solution to the wireless problem is to use a combination of access control lists
and group keys to create clubs of devices that trust each other and do not require
user interaction to make a secure connection. Minimal user interaction is required on
initial connections to determine whether a device should be trusted or not.
4.1 Initial idea using a simple group model
The most natural and user intuitive way to implement the club idea is to have each
device be a president of its own club, and the president controls access into its club
by adding or removing members, as shown in Figure 4-1. At each initial interaction
with an outside device, the user will choose whether to trust the device for future
connections or not. Once the device becomes trusted, the president adds the device
as a member of the club by adding a member ID to the club access control list.
Each device maintains its own club and carries that information with it. The
device does not depend on a central server to tell it who is trusted and who is not.
The device can manage that on its own.
While this is a very simple idea to think about, it does not scale well for large
numbers of devices. The size of the access control lists grow proportionally with the
number of trusted devices. With limited storage memory in small mobile devices,
access control lists quickly become infeasible. In addition, this model is one dimen-
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A B
club A club B
Figure 4-1: A simple model for groups showing two groups, club A and club B. Club
A has members X, Y, and Z. Club B has members U, V, and W.
sional. The connections created between devices are still point to point. If devices
X, Y and Z belong to device A's club, only device A knows to trust them. Devices
X, Y, and Z have no knowledge of whether or not they should trust each other. The
user would have to be involved in adding these devices to each other's groups.
4.2 Group model allowing cross-group member-
ship
To solve the scalability problem, a model with hierarchies is established, as shown in
Figure 4-2. This model builds upon the club idea by letting entire clubs join another
club. In this way, each of the devices in a club can be identified by their club name
instead of their individual device ID. Thus, if device X, Y, and Z belong to club A
and device A joins device B's club, then device X, Y, and Z can also be trusted by
device B. Instead of keeping track of every individual device that is a trusted entity,
devices can now keep track of a group name, which acts as an identifier for multiple
devices. This added layer of hierarchy helps reduce the size of the club membership
list.
However, the chain of trusted devices can quickly grow too large and unmanage-
able. It's possible to soon include everyone in the same club just by joining the club
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Figure 4-2: A group model with hierarchies. If club A joins club B, the X, Y, and Z
automatically become members of club A.
that belongs to another club, that belongs to yet another club. This model does not
scale well.
4.3 Groups with no hierarchy and implicit trusted
links
To prevent the chain of trust from growing too large, clubs will not be allowed to
join other clubs. However, the idea of using a club name will allow members of a
group to identify each other, as shown in Figure 4-3. The chain of trust is now that,
if the president of a group trusts a device, then all the members of the club trust
each other. But, the members do not trust anyone outside of the club. If the club
president trusts the president of another club, only the president will be added to the
club, none of its members will be added, as shown in Figure 4-4.
To identify its members, each club issues some sort of token to each of its members
so that they can prove that they are part of a club. It would be too easy to find out
which clubs belong to which devices and simply claim membership to one of them if
no proof is required. The group token must be some sort of secure token that cannot
be faked by a device or copied from another device. Thus the token must be unique
to both the group and the device that holds the token. Tokens could be faked if they
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Oclub A
Figure 4-3: A group model with implicit
members of a group.
... .. .. ... ..o . .. . . . . ... .....
club B
trusted connections (dotted lines) between
KZJY 
club A club B
Figure 4-4: A group model with implicit trusted connections where clubs are not
allowed join other clubs. B has joined club A, but U, V, and W, which belong in club
B, are not automatically trusted.
36
_1_1 I___
.. ... . .
are easily reproducible, like human readable strings of characters. Tokens could also
be faked if they are simple enough that a dictionary attack could be used to guess a
device's token.
Since the tokens become the proof of whether or not a device is a member of a
club, the presidents no longer need to maintain a list of members. All a device needs
is a public group key to verify that another device is indeed a member of the stated
group. Devices also do not need to keep lists of trusted devices. The device need only
keep the tokens of the groups it belongs to and the corresponding public group keys
for those groups so it can verify other members.
4.3.1 Group Identification
Using a plain text name for a group would make it far too easy for a device to spoof
the name and claim to belong to a group. The club can use a public/private key pair
to identify itself. The club president holds onto the private key, and the members
hold onto the public key. The president can then verify any message sent to it by
one of its members. However, since the group key is public, anyone can get it, even
a device that is not in the club.
The president must have some way to tie the public group key to the device name.
This suggests that the club president should sign the device's name with the club
private key, creating a token, or certificate of sorts. Thus, to prove that the device is
a member of the club, the device must present this certificate. The certificate is the
device ID signed by the club private key. Now, any member of the club can verify
that the device is a member by verifying the token with the group public key and
seeing that the device address matches the device they are talking to.
4.3.2 Validating a Device Name
However, it is still possible for a device to fake the device ID. An attacker could steal
a device's certificate and pretend to be that device. Tokens are easily stolen since
they are publicly available. To prevent this, each device also has a public/private
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key pair. The device must create its own token first by signing its device ID with
the device private key. Thus, anyone trying to verify the device need only have the
device public key to verify the signature. When a device is added as a member of a
group, this token is then given to the club president to sign with the group private
key, which will be called a certificate. Now, even if a device fakes the device ID by
spoofing a hardware MAC address or other device identification data, the user can
still reject the device initially and never add it to a group. In the end, a real person
still has to decide whether or not to add a completely untrusted, unknown device as
a trusted entity. Thus even if the user trusts the spoofed ID, this model is no worse
than what can happen in the current situation.
4.4 Group Model with Virtual President
However, with the club idea stated above, each device or user must remember who the
president of the club is. Otherwise, a new device cannot be added to a group simply by
connecting to members of the group. The dependency again lies in a central trusted
authority. While a connection does not need to be persistent, the central authority
does need to be present when a new device wants to be added to a network. The
model is still not fully distributed. To solve this problem, members of a group should
not have a physical owner, but rather a virtual president that all the members know
about. Since all the members of a club are trusted, they can be trusted to add new
members to the group. Membership in a group is still shown with a token that is the
device token signed by the group private key. The level of hierarchy still remains flat
in that there is only one level, as shown in Figure 4-5. However, new members no
longer need to remember who the club president is or find the club president when
they want to be added.
While two clubs still cannot merge their members such that all members of club
A trust all members of club B if members of B and A connect, as shown in Figure
4-6, the argument can be made that allowing all the members to trust each other is
unnecessary. To use a concrete example, just because Bob's PDA, which is a member
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virtual club A
A
. Z joins club A through Y
XA YA ZA
Figure 4-5: When X and Y connect to each other,
club A. When Z connects to Y, he is also added to
virtual club A
.
they create a virtual club, called
virtual club A
virtual club B
.
o 
XA YA ZA 'UB VB WB
Zc ·.. ,' U
C
virtual club C
Figure 4-6: When Z and U connect, their respective clubs do not become automati-
cally trusted networks. Rather, a new virtual club is formed that others can join.
of Bob's home group, is trusted by Bob's printer, which is a member of Bob's work
group, Bob's printer does not need to trust Bob's home cell phone, as shown in Figure
4-7.
4.5 Group model with 3-tiered Hierarchy
How might this scale in such a way that not every member of the club will be carrying
around the club private key? A hierarchy can be created such that it resembles a 3-tier
structure, with a president, executives, and employees, as shown in Figure 4-8. The
president (tier 1) of the club can add executives (tier 2) to the club. Executives can
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Bob's PDA
..................................... . .
printer
Figure 4-7: Bob's PDA belongs to his home network, but also happens to be trusted
by his work printer "group." However, the trust chain does not need to extend such
that the cell phone needs to trust the printer.
add employees to the club, but employees cannot add new employees. All members
of the club, including employees, executives, and the president have implicit trust
relationships between one another. Executives and employees of a "parent club" are
allowed to become presidents of their own clubs (call them sub-clubs), but members of
the sub-clubs are not automatically extended trust relationships to the parent clubs.
Executives and the president hold the club private key, and thus can give tokens
to other group members. Regular employees are not allowed to add other members.
This limits the number of devices that have access to the private club key while not
limiting the number of devices that can join the group. Adding a new member does
not require a device to find the actual owner of the group. In addition, this model is
still very simple and requires no user knowledge of what happens in the background.
The user still only needs to decide whether or not a device should be trusted and
added to a group. The new idea is shown in Figure 4-8.
4.6 The Final Design
The final design is to use clubs to maintain trusted relationships between all members
in the club. An example is of the process for devices to authenticate each other (4-
9 and the process to add a new member (4-10. The final design has the following
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club A
....... . *president
ZAA
XA A YA A  executives
UA VA WA members
..............................................................................................................
Figure 4-8: A model for 3-tier club hierarchy. Presidents can add executive members.
Executive members hold the club private key, and can add regular members. Regular
members cannot add others to the group.
specifications:
* No club will be able to join another club. Membership into clubs is only allowed
on an individual by individual basis.
* Clubs are identified by a shared public key, the corresponding private key for
the club is held by the club president and/or the executives, depending on the
implementation.
* The club private key is used to add members to a club by signing a unique
token belonging to each member of the club, creating a certificate.
* Tokens consist of a device ID that has been signed by the device private key.
* Certificates are device tokens that have been signed by a group private key.
* Verification will be done through the use of corresponding public keys.
This design is scalable because of the use of groups, and there is no longer a
need for large lists. The design is also secure because of the keys used to both verify
membership in a group and validity of the device. There is also not an interminable
chain of trust that can grow too long to be useful.
41
xX sends
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matching groups in
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Figure 4-9: Device X and device Y
exchange process that occurs when
A
belong to club A. This diagram shows the token
device Y wants to connect to device X.
Y
Y sends
A verifies
Y_token with
Y_devicepub_key
J Y_token
if no match, pass to user
if match
A signs
Y_token with
A_grouppriv_key
creating Y_certificate
A sends
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Agrouppub_key Y stores
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A_grouppub_key
Figure 4-10: Device Y requests to be added to club A. At this point, the devices have
already exchanged public keys and determined that they are not in the same group.
The user has approved adding Y to club A.
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Chapter 5
Implementation
An implementation of the idea from Chapter 4 can be done using Bluetooth networks.
Bluetooth was chosen because it is ideal for small, mobile devices with limited battery
life. In addition, Bluetooth device connections have the specific problem of requiring
users to enter PINs and store device pairings in a complex user model. This chap-
ter presents a detailed technical introduction to Bluetooth, implementation details
specific to Bluetooth, and a summary of the implemented system.
5.1 Use of Bluetooth
Bluetooth was chosen because its capabilities in wireless mobile devices is optimized
for an infrastructureless network.
In addition, Bluetooth device connections are a hassle and unintuitive. During a
connection between two devices, a user must enter identical PINs on the two devices
synchronously, otherwise the process will time out. Unless a user chooses to "pair" the
two devices, the process must be repeated each time a connection is made. "Pairing"
devices means saving the connection information for future use. While users can save
a certain number of pairings for future use, that number is usually very low. A user
should not have to enter a PIN every time he wants to update his cell phone address
book to his PC address book.
Bluetooth is a radio technology that operates in the unlicensed 2.4 GHz spec-
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trum. Created almost 10 years ago by researchers at Ericsson for short-range wireless
communication, their original goal was to come up with a technology for wireless cell
phone headsets. People soon realized that Bluetooth had the power to do much more
and the Bluetooth Special Interest Group was established to formally lay out the
specifications for the protocol as they stand today [12].
5.2 Technology background
Bluetooth is a radio technology that operates in the 2.402-2.48 GHz spectrum. The
spectrum is divided into 79 channels of 1 MHz each. Signals are transmitted using
a Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum scheme such that packet transmissions are
distributed pseudo-randomly across the 79 channels. Bluetooth is similar to 802.11
technology, but it is less expensive in terms of material cost and is also lower power to
operate. In terms of size, Bluetooth chip sets are much smaller than those for 802.11,
and thus are more appropriate for small mobile devices. Bluetooth has a maximum
data transfer rate of 780 kbps.
Bluetooth can be divided into three main parts, as shown in Figure 5-1. There is
the radio, which takes care of all communications across the air. It sends and receives
packets from the baseband processor, which is the next part. The baseband does all
the processing between the low level packets that are sent/received over the air and
the data that higher level applications want to send/receive. The next level is the
link manager, which manages the host controller interface between Bluetooth and the
device that is sending data through Bluetooth. The link manager is important for
understanding how connections are made.
5.2.1 Making connections
The following processes, as shown in Figure 5-2 are done by the link manager.
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Inquiry mode
Bluetooth devices connect by inquiring for other Bluetooth devices and requesting a
connection. A device goes into inquiry state to ping for other devices in the area.
Devices who are listening for inquiries are in inquiry scan state. While in inquiry
(or any of its substates) state, devices utilize an inquiry-hopping sequence, which is
twice the rate of the nominal frequency hopping rate. Devices can respond with their
Bluetooth device address and a clock value from the device's Bluetooth clock. The
clock value is used to generate a hopping sequence for paging devices. The inquiry-
hopping scheme is twice the rate of the hopping scheme used by listening devices.
Paging mode
When two devices decide to make a connection to each other, one device goes into
page state to page the requested device. The requested device must be in page scan
state to respond to pages. A device can be in page scan and inquiry scan state at
the same time. Once appropriate packets are exchanged in page state, devices are
then able to connect. Authentication can be done any time after the devices have
connected.
The inquiry and page processes are slow because the devices are hopping on ran-
dom frequencies in an inquiry (or page) hopping sequence. Inquiring devices hop
twice as fast as the scanning devices. A scanning device also waits a random period
Host
Figure 5-1: Bluetooth module components.
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of time after it hears the second inquiry before responding to prevent everyone from
responding at once. Thus, there is some latency between an inquiry and the time
when another device will actually hear the inquiry.
5.2.2 Authentication
Authentication requires users of the two connecting devices to enter matching PINs
into the device when prompted. It is up to the implementation of the higher level
applications to determine if and when authentication is needed. Authentication can
happen at any time while there is a connection between two devices. The matching
PINs allow the generation of a temporary link key to secure the connection between
the two devices. When it is determined that the devices are trusted entities, a per-
manent link key is generated from a 128 bit random number and the 48 bit Bluetooth
device address. While most implementations require users to manually enter the PIN
into the device, this not a requirement of the Bluetooth specification. The PINs can
be preset within the device such that it always uses the same PIN, or a random PIN
can be dynamically generated when needed and securely exchanged with the other
device. Most implementations require users to enter the PIN as that is the most
secure method of authentication since nothing has to be sent across the air that could
be sniffed [5].
The exchange of PINs is not required every time two devices connect to each other.
If two devices have connected in the past, and created a permanent link key (by going
through the authentication process) that is still valid for both devices, then the link
Figure 5-2: Bluetooth device modes while in the process of connecting.
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key can be reused for the current session. The link key is used to determine if the
devices are the intended target of the connection by using the link key to operate on
a random number. The challenger sends a random number to the target device, the
target device will then operate on the random number with the link key. The result
will be returned to the challenger. If the result is the expected result, the connection
is secured, if not, the devices will have to go through the authentication procedure
again with a new PIN to generate a temporary link key, and then eventually another
permanent ink key.
5.3 Specific Implementation
The ideal solution is to have a system where devices in the same group are able to
identify themselves as such so that connection and authentication can be done with
minimal user interface. The goals are to minimize user involvement in the connection
process, make devices connect seamlessly and intuitively, maintain a secure network,
and use a simple and straightforward design.
In Chapter 4, several ideas were presented for creating user groups. The two
main ideas, one using a flat group structure with implicit trust relationships, and the
other using a 3-tier hierarchy, are revisited here specifically in the realm of Bluetooth
devices.
5.3.1 Bluetooth User Model
There are three ways one can use Bluetooth devices: in a small personal area network,
in a large public network, or in single point to point connections. Depending on the
goals of each scenario, the implementation of the solution will have minor changes.
The final result is that a slightly less optimal solution for general networks is actually
a better solution for Bluetooth use.
In personal area networks, a user will use Bluetooth to link various devices in the
home or at the office. Examples of this include replacing the cables between PC and
printer, PC and scanner, PC and keyboard, etc. In addition, a user can send files
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between his laptop and his PDA via Bluetooth, or even send contact information
from his cell phone to his PC via Bluetooth. In a situation like this, a user might
intuitively see the PC as a "president" of the devices in his home, a central node to
which all the devices will connect at one point or another.
It would make sense to create a flat group structure such that each device authen-
ticates itself to the PC, and the PC adds everyone to the PC group. All devices within
the PC group have implicit trust relationships so that additional authentication does
not have to be done when the PDA tries to print to the printer or the laptop receives
a file from the scanner.
It makes less sense to create a hierarchical 3-tier structure because the user neither
cares to know or needs to know about the hierarchy, and also because there are
situations where the wrong devices might get added to a group. A scenario exists
that a user's laptop might be an "executive" member in both a home group and an
office group. The laptop adds the user's PDA to the home group as an "employee."
However, the laptop also adds the user's PDA to the office group as an employee
because the user does not choose which group the PDA gets to join-that process
is transparent to the user. In this case, another member of the office group, say, a
coworker's PDA, will now automatically connect to the user's PDA, which is not a
secure situation.
In a large public network, a user might download information to his cell phone from
a public kiosk using Bluetooth. For this scenario, the flat group structure does not
work because the user does not necessarily want to trust all the devices that a public
kiosk trusts. However, the hierarchy model does not work either, since it also provides
implicit trust relationships between the user's device and other devices trusted by the
kiosk. A user needs functionality such that he can authenticate himself with one
kiosk and be able to use all the other kiosks in a building without re-authenticating
himself. A model that works well for this situation is the cross-group membership
model, where entire groups of devices can join another device's group. The entire
group of kiosks in a building can join the device's group, and the device can trust
only the kiosks.
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The last situation is point to point connections between devices. These are sce-
narios where a user might want to send a picture from his cell phone to his friend's
cell phone via Bluetooth. This situation works well for the virtual president group
structure. A group of friends who commonly send images or messages to one another
would find it convenient to all be a part of the same group without having to make
connections to each and every friend. Once a new friend joins a group by authenticat-
ing with one user, he is able to connect to all the other friends in the group without
making additional connections. The distributed key system is good because a new
friend does not have to seek out a specific person to join the group. Any one of the
friends can bring a new friend into the group.
5.3.2 Design Goals
The situation this implementation focuses on is the first situation of a home group
or an office group. Thus, the flat group structure with implicit trust links between
members is used. To define a group, there should be a list containing descriptors that
identify members of the group. When a device claims to be a member of a group:
* there should be a way to verify that the device is indeed a current member of
the group.
* there should be a way to ensure that members of a group cannot be faked or
spoofed.
* there should be a way to ensure that member lists are updated.
* there should be a way for members of the same group to detect that they are
in the same group without going through a PIN exchange.
Each group will have three tiers: the president, the executive members, and the
employees. The president and the executives will hold the private key for the group.
The president can only add executives, and executives can only add employees. Em-
ployees cannot add new members to the group.
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Every device belongs to at least one group: a group that contains itself, with the
device itself as owner. The owner of the group controls which members are added
and deleted. Devices can belong to as many groups as it wishes.
A simple example of the protocol can be shown with three devices: a laptop, a
PDA and a cell phone. Each device can be the president of its own club. For this
example, say the PDA requests to connect to the laptop. The laptop will check to
see if the PDA belongs to the laptop's club, or if the two devices belong to the same
higher level club. If so, the PDA is allowed to connect to the laptop. If no matching
clubs are found, the PDA must join the laptop's club.
Next, say a PDA and a cell phone are both a part of the laptop's club. If the
PDA and the cell phone want to connect to each other, they can do so because they
both belong to the same club. Members of a club cannot add new members, only
presidents may do so. Thus, if another cell phone comes along and becomes a member
of the PDA's club, the cell phone is not automatically able to connect to the laptop
because they are not part of the same immediate club.
" .. ...... , ,''"
Figure 5-3: PDA and cell phone belong to laptop's club. PDA and cell phone can
connect without additional user authentication because they belong to the same club.
The implementation can be divided into three main parts.
50
___I _11_
'···.
5.3.3 Device identification functions
Device identification functions are required to create keys and tokens by which devices
and groups can be identified. This includes the generation of a public/private key
pair for the device, public/private key pair for the club, and device ID token.
mylkeys()
This function uses RSA_generatekey() to create both the device's public/private
key pair and the club's public/private key pair. It writes the public and private keys
into separate files so they can be accessed at later times and also so they can be sent
to other devices as necessary. A device token is also created by signing the device's
Bluetooth address with the device's private key, using RSA_sign(). This token is also
saved into a file for access later.
5.3.4 Group and member validation
Group and member validation requires functions to sort through lists of groups, ex-
change public keys for both the device and the group, and verification functions to
confirm whether or not the member belongs to the group and whether the device is
who it claims to be. The list sorting functions are required to find out if two devices
belong to the same group. Public keys need to be exchanged so that the verification
functions can use public keys to verify that the tokens presented by members are
valid.
verifymember()
This function reads acceptor and requester club lists and looks for a shared club. If
a shared club is found, the acceptor is challenged to present a certificate showing
membership in a club. The certificate is verified using rsa_verify() with the group
public key. The device token is verified with the device public key. If the keys match,
allow the connection, otherwise pass the function to the user to decide whether or
not to connect.
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5.3.5 New member services
New member services are a group of functions that allow a new member to be added
to a group. This requires functions to sign a device token to produce a certificate
showing membership to the group, and a PIN generation function to create device-
generated PINs for the creation of a new temporary link.
addmiember()
This function adds a new member to a group. The function must first verify the
signature on the device token using rsaverify() and the device's public key. If the
signature verifies, the group president then signs the device token using rsasign()
and the group private key. The signed token, or certificate, is then returned to the
device where the device will store it in a file for later use.
5.3.6 Removing members
When a device is no longer trusted to belong in a club, there must be a way to
remove it. To remove a member, a group generates a new group public/private key
pair. While this is a tedious process to add all members back into the group, it is
assumed that when a user decides to add a device to a group, he will not want to
quickly remove it again.
This function simply erases the old club public keys from its file and generates
a new club public/private key pair. All former members of the group will have to
rejoin.
5.4 Bluetooth specific implementation trade-offs
The need for a link key to establish a secure Bluetooth connection provides two
options for how to implement the system. If two devices are members of the same
group but have never actually connected to each other before, a link key is necessary
to create a secure link. To create a secure link, a permanent link key is needed. If a
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link key exists from a previous connection, it can be reused. However, in this case,
the devices are already trusted devices so the user should not have to decide whether
to trust or not. The end result is that the user should never have to manually enter a
PIN unless the two devices do not belong to the same group and the user must decide
whether or not to trust a new member.
Thus, there are two ways to determine if a device should be trusted or not. The
devices can either check to see if there is a permanent link key created from a previous
connection, or check to see if the devices are in the same group. Thus, there are two
options for the implementation:
1. check for group membership and device verification first, if those pass, then
check for link key or generate a new one
2. check for the existence of a link key, if one exists, continue with connection,
otherwise check for group membership.
Option 1 has the benefit that it is an intuitive model. Let the devices check
for higher level trust before looking at the lower levels of link keys. However, the
processes to check for group membership and then device verification are far more
involved than just checking for a link key at the Bluetooth protocol level.
Option 2 is simpler to understand and implement. The permanent link key can be
the same as the group public key. Thus, two steps, checking for groups and checking
for link keys, can be done in the same step. If neither the group or the link key
check out, then the device will need to request a new connection. However, since the
link keys are also used to encrypt the connection, using a shared permanent link key
makes the connections less secure.
The implementation shown will use Option 1 since the current goal is not to
modify the specifications of Bluetooth.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
The goal of this thesis is to motivate and implement a solution for creating large
networks of mobile devices intuitively. A user should be able to connect all the
mobile devices he uses on a regular basis in a way that does not cause him to break
the flow of his activities, like typing in a password. The solution to this problem is to
create groups of trusted devices that, once added as a member of the group, required
no further user interaction when connecting or using.
Current models for creating secure mobile networks are not appropriate for the
needs of an average user looking to create a network of the devices that he uses on a
day to day basis.
The solution to the problem generalizes well for large numbers of devices and
a small number of devices as well. Authorizing and authenticating devices is not
dependent upon the number of devices in a network. In addition, the number of
connections a user must make is linear with regards to the number of devices in a
network as opposed to being squared. The solution provides the user with a simple
and intuitive way of organizing devices and creating connections between them such
that he can use the devices on demand and not worry about remembering the right
password or finding the right cable.
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6.1 Extending functionality to all devices
The above solution would create a system in which secure connections between devices
become very simple to create. The decisions that a user or a device needs to make
becomes very clear: trust the device or not. This opens the door for devices with
limited computational power or user interface/feedback to create secure connections.
If "dumb" mobile devices can be given wireless capabilities, the possibility for natural
interaction with wireless becomes realizable on a large scale.
One current problem is the prevalence of "dumb" devices that would benefit from
Bluetooth capabilities but do not have them for one reason or another. Examples
of "dumb" devices include scanners, MP3 players, printers, keyboards, mice, etc.
Gradually, post-purchase hardware is becoming available to make off the shelf prod-
ucts Bluetooth enabled. For examples, there are dongles to make printers Bluetooth
enabled, and keyboard and mice sets that come with Bluetooth built in. However,
there is still the problem that these dumb devices, i.e. devices without user interface
capabilities like buttons or display panels, are far less user intuitive to connect via
Bluetooth because there is no feedback.
To bridge the gap between the devices currently on the market and a world where
all devices can communicate wirelessly, a Bluetooth USB dongle can be used. The
simplification of the connection process makes it easy to create a dongle that would
allow off-the-shelf products that are not Bluetooth enabled to become Bluetooth
enabled. This dongle will be able to give any USB device Bluetooth capabilities.
Unlike Bluetooth dongles currently on the market, this device would accept USB
(Universal Serial Bus) devices, i.e., it would allow any device with a USB-B or mini-
B male connector to plug into it. Thus many devices like keyboards, mice, MP3
players, digital cameras, printers, and scanners can all be made Bluetooth capable.
The devices do not even have to know that there is Bluetooth on the other end of the
connection, for all they know, it is still USB, so the products do not require any sort
of modification. The processing can be done all within the dongle itself. An example
is shown in Figure 6-1.
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USB A
port
Bluetooth USB 
module Host Controller
Microprocessor Memory
Power Supply
Figure 6-1: Block diagram of dongle design.
6.1.1 The Bluetooth USB Dongle
The user has to make two decisions: on one hand the user has to choose which device
to connect to. One the other hand the user chooses whether or not to add a new
device to a group. These are two functions that can easily be encapsulated onto two
buttons that can be added to devices lacking any sort of complex user interface.
There is no need for other options. The user does not need to know whether a
device is a president, an executive, or a member. The only difference that makes is
one extra connection. If a user wants to connect to a device that is a member of
club A, he can make that connection then and get the information he needs at that
moment. If a user then needs to connect to an executive in club A, he still has to
initialize that connection since he is not yet a trusted member of club A. However, if
executive A decides to trust the user, he then becomes a member of club A. The user
now has implicit trust relationships between everyone in club A.
The two buttons on this device need to provide the function for "connect to this
device" and "allow device to join group." Proximity can be used to determine which
device to connect to. An example of the two-button device is shown in Figure 6-2.
6.1.2 Design
However, the design of this dongle is a fairly challenging task. There are a few main
design goals:
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Bluetooth USB dongle to USB device
Figure 6-2: Prototype of dongle with two buttons. The "connect" button connects
the device on the dongle to the nearest Bluetooth device. The "add/join" button
adds a device to the group or joins a device's existing group.
* the dongle must be wireless, since the point of making something Bluetooth
enabled is to get rid of the wires.
* the dongle must be low power and be able to run off batteries.
* the dongle must be able to support the functionality of the design from Chapter
4.
Because the dongle has to accept USB slave devices, the dongle must be designed
as a USB host. USB hosts, not to be confused with USB hubs, are required to
be able to source a certain amount of current to downstream devices, have enough
storage space to store a reasonable number of device drivers on the host, and must
have USB-A female connectors. There are two connector types, USB-A, and USB-B.
USB mini-B connectors are used on small devices that do not have enough space
for a full sized USB-B connector. USB-A connectors are used explicitly for upstream
connections, i.e. the USB ports in the back of a PC are USB-A female connectors, and
the male connectors on the ends of keyboards and scanners are USB-A connectors.
USB-B connectors are explicitly downstream connectors. The USB ports in digital
cameras or MP3 players are USB-B ports, or USB mini-B ports.
Some of the challenges faced in designing such a product include the need for
drivers for all the possible peripherals that might be plugged into the dongle. Some
basic, generic drivers could be stored on board, but in order to make this dongle
small, portable, and easy to use, memory on board is limited. Drivers could also
be downloaded dynamically as they are needed, but there is still the problem that
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once the device plugs into the dongle, the dongle needs to know how to communicate
with the device. Another challenge is the need for a fast microprocessor to do the
processing necessary both for the USB connection and the Bluetooth radio. Since
USB packets are not in a standard serial format, there must be a way for the USB
connection to process data from the Bluetooth device.
USB hubs, unlike USB hosts, are simply repeaters that take the signal from the
USB host and repeat it to any devices that need to hear it downstream. Thus, the hub
basically allows one USB port to expand to many. Hosts have far more functionality
and require far more complexity. The computer is the most familiar example of a
USB host.
In addition to the USB host capabilities, the dongle must also support Bluetooth
capabilities. This requires a Bluetooth module that contains the Bluetooth radio
and the baseband processor. The host controller interface on the Bluetooth module
must be able to support some form of low level communication with the USB host
controller.
6.2 Human-centric authorization models and us-
age scenarios
The two-button dongle idea is a huge step towards designing human-centric systems
for wireless., mobile devices. Two buttons were chosen because of its simplicity and
appropriateness for the group keys model. It is obvious that a keypad is far more
complex than necessary since it provides no improvement over the current model of
entering PINs and passwords. The question becomes whether two buttons are really
necessary. Two buttons are still more than a user should have to worry about. Can
functionality be contained in one button? The single button can be used only for
adding members or joining groups, and connections can be done automatically based
on proximity and group membership.
The intersection of wireless devices and mobile personal area networks is an area
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for which the solution space has thus far been all but human-centric. There should
be a generalized solution for connecting wireless, mobile devices in such a way that
the user only has to worry about whether or not he should trust the device as family
or as a stranger. While both the two-button idea and the group keys model presented
is intended for Bluetooth devices, it can easily be generalized for all scenarios where
wireless devices need to connect and disconnect frequently.
Wireless, mobile devices are not limited to just those devices that interact with
a computer or a laptop. Remote controls and home entertainment centers also very
naturally fall into the category where intuitive ways to link remote controls with the
appropriate device are useful. Does one button suffice for a situation like this? Does
a user actually want to walk up to the DVD player with a remote control and press
a button to "activate" the connection before being able to use the remote? One can
argue that this is fine, since the user needs to walk to the DVD player to put in a
DVD before he can watch it.
6.3 Closing thoughts
In the end, a complete solution for allowing users to intuitively connect their mobile
devices is far from complete, but this thesis has presented one idea which takes a step
in the right direction. Mobile devices have become a permanent part of a person's
daily life, and the need to connect those devices to each other is crucial to how useful
those devices can be. Current designs have not provided users a natural way to
connect mobile devices.
This thesis creates a way for wireless mobile devices to easily connect to one
another without the need for complicated passwords and user-visible security schemes.
It presents a solution to the connectivity problem by using groups and hierarchy to
allow each device to maintain a set of explicit and implicit trust relationships with
other devices. The trust relationships allow devices to connect, authenticate, and
authorize each other without the user having to remember passwords or PINs. An
example of this solution is implemented to solve the current problem with complex
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Bluetooth device connection models. The solution not only removes the unintuitive
Bluetooth connection model of entering PINs and pairing devices, but provides an
even more secure way to connect the devices.
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